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order to pursue the war on terrorism. I also noted from the last 
hearing that you asked the very pertinent question of the Govern-
ment officials, law enforcement officials who were testifYing, which 
of the new powers that they had gotten post-9/ll were helpful and 
important to them. And none of the powers that any of those wit-
nesses listed-as Senator Feingold noted, not a single one of them 
included Section 215 or the others that we and other critics are ob-
jecting to. So I think this, like RFRA, could be very constructively 
an area where there are common concerns and a meeting of the 
minds. 
Very quickly with respect to Chairman Hatch's second question, 
what are we asking for, that is laid out specifically on pages 15 to 
16 of my written testimony. High among them is one of the modest 
reform measures that has been endorsed by broad bipartisan lead-
ership, including on this Committee Senators Craig, Durbin and 
Feingold. 
What these provisions would do is return the law closer to where 
it was pre-PATRIOT Act, completely consistent with the testimony 
that you heard from the law enforcement officials at your last hear-
ing. None of these modest reforms-not repeals-would interfere 
with the powers that they have said are necessary for them in 
order to protect us all from terrorism. 
So I very much appreciate this opportunity and look forward to 
continuing to work together constructively. 
[The prepared statement of Ms. Strossen appears as a submis-
sion for the record.] 
Chairman HATCH. Thank you. 
Professor Dinh. 
STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Mr. DINH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Mem-
ber Leahy, members of the Committee. Thank you very much for 
the honor and the pleasure of being here to talk about this very 
important topic. I have a written statement which I ask to be sub-
mitted for the record. 
Chairman HATCH. We will submit all written statements as 
though fully delivered, so you won't have to say that anymore. 
Mr. DINH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like 
very quickly to go through some of the concerns that the Ranking 
Member and my colleagues have expressed, as well as some con-
cerns that have been expressed in the public debate. 
I first want to echo Congressman Barr's bipartisan statement 
that we are all in good faith trying to discover the best way to pro-
tect the civil liberties and security of America at a time when these 
things are under threat. I know that no one in the Department of 
Justice, no one in the administration, no one at this table or other 
participants in this debate question the patriotism of those who en-
gage in this debate. Governance is not a static process; it is a dy-
namic process, and I appreciate this Committee taking its time to 
do this valuable work in light of the threat of terror threatening 
our civil liberties. 
I want to go through my opening statement by converting my 
prepared statement to track the constitutional amendments that 
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seem to be of concern. I want to start first with the First Amend-
ment, and then the Fourth Amendment, and then conclude with 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment regarding the right to trial by 
jury. 
With respect to the First Amendment, much noise and much crit-
icism has been directed at Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
As members of this Committee well know, Section 215 translates 
into the national security context, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act context, powers that preexisted Section 215, powers that 
the grand jury has always had since time immemorial and indeed 
can be exercised by prosecutors and investigators with much lesser 
checks than those that this Committee and Congress have afforded 
in Section 215. 
I do not doubt that individual activists and organizations may 
well feel a chill to their First Amendment activity. I do not doubt 
that these fears are sincere. I am also very confident they are not 
founded because they really should be addressed to preexisting 
criminal processes that preexisted Section 215. And indeed it is a 
legitimate question whether or not to extend to other contexts the 
protections of Section 215 and elsewhere in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act that do not permit Government officials to target 
First Amendment activities by the use of these powers. That is a 
legitimate debate. 
Indeed, I note here that in the Attorney General's revisions to 
the Attorney General guidelines which he published last June, 
June of 2002, at page 7 he instituted administratively such a re-
striction that investigations not be targeted solely at First Amend-
ment activities, thereby extending the same protection that Section 
215 affords to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorities to 
general criminal processes. 
I do think that questions regarding confidentiality and secrecy 
are very weighty ones in our constitutional structure, including in 
our criminal processes. That is why I welcome the very significant 
restrictions that Section 215 puts on law enforcement authorities, 
including the accountability provisions that the Department of Jus-
tice is under obligation to report to Congress every 6 months. 
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, Congressman Barr has 
noted that there has been significant concern regarding the USA 
PATRIOT Act. And much more importantly, preexisting authority 
in criminal law and foreign intelligence surveillance may have an 
undue burden on our constitutional protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures. These are significant concerns. 
One of the commentaries that I have on the current debate is 
that the focus on what are considered to be politically-charged or 
sexy issues, like Section 215, like the delayed notice provisions, has 
drowned out legitimate conversation and debate regarding how we 
go about protecting the Fourth Amendment even as we use these 
very important tools in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
For example, Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act makes a very 
critical change to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to allow 
better communication and coordination between law enforcement 
and intelligence. I don't think anybody, including those at this 
table and other critics, have questioned that underlying change in 
law. 
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Many questions, however, are raised by that change in law, in-
cluding what exclusion procedures would be applicable. Are they 
Fourth Amendment exclusion procedures, are they FISA exclusion 
procedures, or are they procedures under the Classified Informa-
tion Protection Act? These are the questions that the courts, in par-
ticular the district court of Florida in the Sami Al-Arian case, are 
trying to work out and ultimately the courts will answer. But these 
are the kinds of questions that I think the public debate should 
focus on and this Committee will focus on in the near future in 
order to ascertain what, if anything, we can do in order to better 
protect the Fourth Amendment. 
Finally, a note about the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the 
right to trial. There has been much talk regarding the detention of 
Mr. Jose Padilla and also Yasser Hamdi. Focus has been put on the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial and how these rights are 
not being afforded to these particular individuals. 
Also of relevance, of course, is Article II of the Constitution, 
which grants to the President the commander-in-chief authority. It 
is under this authority that the President has sought military de-
tention of these individuals, just as Presidents in other times of 
war have detained battlefield detainees in order to incapacitate 
them from doing harm to our men and women fighting on the bat-
tlefield. 
In this war against terror, the terrorist has chosen the battlefield 
not to be restricted to Mghanistan or Iraq, but indeed expanding 
to Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and, of course, on September 11, 
the World Trade Center and Washington, D.C. In such a cir-
cumstance, I think it is an easy question, not particularly an easy 
question, but I think it is only a small step to extend the Presi-
dent's authority to detain battlefield detainees outside the tradi-
tional battlefield. 
A much harder question, one that I think the Supreme Court will 
ultimately answer-and frankly I do not find much support in the 
cases to provide the answer-is whether or not the Court will defer 
to the Executive when there is nothing to defer to; that is where 
there are no alternative processes, either military, executive or 
other types of processes, as we have seen in the past with the In 
Re Quirin or Ex Parte Milligan cases. Those are the questions that 
the Second Circuit grappled with yesterday. I think ultimately the 
Supreme Court will answer those questions. 
I would note, in conclusion, however, that it is not the Court 
alone that should be answering these questions, and it certainly 
should not be the Executive alone. But this body, this Committee, 
has a very significant voice in the constitutional debate, and I sin-
cerely hope that out of these hearings and out of the increased at-
tention paid to these issues would be a Congressional voice with re-
spect to these very, very important issues. 
Thank you very much. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dinh appears as a submission for 
the record.] 
Chairman HATCH. Thank you, Professor. 
Mr. Zogby. 
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Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
"America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved Or Freedom Lost? 
November 18, 2003 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 
QUESTIONS FOR PROFESSQR VIET DlNH 
I have been deeply troubled by the Administration's recent action with respect to so-called 
"enemy combatants." I can imagine no greater modem-day threat to civil liberties and to our 
historic understanding of due process than the Administration's insistence !hat it has 
unfettered power to detain indefinitely any individual (including U.S. citizens seized on 
U.S. soil) - without charging them with anY crime. without trial and without providing them 
with access to an attorney. It strikes me that, at the Very least, these individuals should be 
afforded a roeaningful opportunity to contest their status. 
Question: I Was intrigued by your testimony on this subject and especially appreciative 
of your willingness to concede that many of the questions on this topic are both difficult and 
without precedent. In your testimony, you suggested that Congress has an important role to 
play in helping the Administration develop a coherent policy with respect to enemy 
combatants. Please describe in greater detail the role that you belieye Congress can and 
should play? What, if any, statutory improvements would you suggest? 
ANSWER: 
I am grateful for your question and your genuine desire to assist the executive branch in this 
most difficult of decisions in these most difficult of times. It is my strong belief that the 
Constitution commits the whole of executive power in the President of the United States. 
Compare U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 1, cl. 1, with id. Art. II, sec. I, cl. 1. Perhaps in no other 
area is executive duty higher--and, correspondingly, executive authority greater-than the 
defense of our nation and the conduct of armed conflict against enemy belligerents. 
That said, Congress has a significant voice in the conduct of executive branch activities. As 
Justice Jackson famously articulated in his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Cases, 
executive authority in areas of shared power ebbs with congressional disapproval and rises 
with congressional acquiescence. In matters of core executive authority such as war, 
however, it is important that Congress does not act in a manner that unduly intrudes in 
executive prerogative and creates unnecessary constitutional conflicts with a coordinate 
branch of government. Such care is counseled as much by the reality that our enemies not 
be able to question our country's resolve as by concern for the constitutional separation of 
powers. 
The Administration recently announced that it would permit lawyers access to Yasser 
Hamdi and Jose Padilla. This is an important development because the government has 
always maintained that the courthouse doors are open to the detainees to challenge the 
legality of their detention through habeas corpus. Access to counsel makes access to the 
courts meaningful. 
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The determination as to when and under what circumstances to grant access to counsel 
disruptive to the interrogation process necessarily rests witb the executive in the first 
instance. Few would doubt that, if AI Qaeda leaders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed were 
held in U.S. tenitory, they would have continuing intelligence value and government efforts 
to extract information should not be disrupted. On the other hand, when access would not 
disrupt the intelligence flow, as the government has decided for Hamdi, the government has 
no reason to bar detainees from speaking with their lawyers. 
There is room for the Administration to move into even safer legal harbor by providing, 
after a reasonable period, some procedure for Padilla and Hamdi to contest the underlying 
facts of their detention. It need not be full-dress judicial process. A military hearing to 
evaluate the information underlying the detention would suffice. The Supreme Court is 
more likely to defer to an executive judgment when the process by which it is anived at is 
capable of inspection. 
The developments in the Hamdi and Padilla cases should comfort those who distrust 
executive authority because they demonstrate that the Administration is exercising its 
discretion responsibly to accommodate changed circumstances. Likewise, those who 
support executive prerogative should commend the Administration for not pushing the 
envelope and risk a judicial backlash that would erode presidential authority. 
The Administration's action is especially noteworthy given Congress' silence. Two years 
after the horror of9/11 and recognizing that the Administration's efforts have successfully 
protected the American homeland from another catastrophic terrorist attack, it is time for 
Congress to contribute its voice, either to affirm the President's authority or to suggest 
refmements to Administration policy. I agree with Judge Michael Chertoffthat the country 
collectively needs think more systematically about a sustainable architecture for 
determining when, why, and for how long someone may be detained as an enemy 
combatant. 
With respect to specific procedures, one must distinguish between preliminary processes to 
determine whether a person is an enemy combatant (which are akin to the military or 
executive version of a probable cause hearing) and military tribunals to determine a 
combatant's unlawful conduct (which are akin to the military or executive version ofa 
trial). One should also keep in mind that any person under U.S. detention has a right to file 
a habeas petition to challenge the legality of his detention. Whether the courts would 
intervene depends on a host of questions-whether the person is being held in U.S. tenitory, 
whether the person is a U.S. citizen, to what extent would the courts defer to executive fact-
finding and decisionmaking processes, etC.-which the Supreme Court is currently 
considering in several cases. 
Question: It appears that the Administration is making somewhat arbitrary and ad hoc 
decisions regarding designation of individuals as enemy combatants. There appear to be no 
uniform principles that guide the decision-making process - as evidenced by the fact that 
seemingly simjlar defendants are treated very differently. For example, both Yasser Hamdj 
and John Walker Lindh are both U.S. citizens supposedly captured on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan and then shipped to the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- yet, 
Hamdi has been designated an enemy combatant. and Walker Lindh's case was settled 
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within the context of the civilian criminal system. How would you suggest that the 
designation policy be modified to make the process morc uniform and coherent? 
As an initial matter, one must distinguish between preliminary processes to determine 
whether a person is an enemy combatant (which are akin to the military or executive version 
of a probable CRuse hearing) and military tribunals to determine a combatant's unlawful 
conduct (which are akin to the military or executive version of a trial). One should also 
keep in mind that any person under U.S. detention has a right to file a habeas petition to 
challenge the legality of his detention. Whether the courts would intervene depends on a 
host of questions-whether the person is being held in U.S. territory, whether the person is 
a U.S. citizen, to what extent would the courts defer to executive fact-finding and 
decisionmaking processes, etc.-which the Supreme Court is currently considering in 
several cases. 
The initial decisions by the executive whether to designate a person as an enemy combatant 
subject to military detention or to bring a criminal indictment, whether to achieve justice 
through a military tribunal or through civilian criminal courts, and under what 
circumstances to grant access to counselor other procedures ofnecessity depend on the 
circumstances of particular cases. That is why, I believe, that the Constitution commits 
these decisions to the Executive in the first instance, subject as always to judicial review 
under habeas proceedings. 
Ouestion: Assuming that the President under certain limited circumstances. should be 
able to designate individuals as enemy combatants - what basic criteria should inform 
designation decisions? What factors should the executive branch consider when designating 
an individual as an enemy combatant as opposed to a prisoner-of-war or criminal 
defendant? 
The general considerations include whether a person has continuing intelligence value, 
whether sources and methods of intelligence would be compromised if revealed in a public 
trial, and the timing of any eventual adjudication. The civilian criminal system operates 
under very strict legal and constitutional mandates with respect to these considerations. At 
the same time, a military process I believe could accommodate the military interest in these 
areas while affording basic protections against mistake or abuse. The exact parameters of 
this process depend on a host of questions--whether the person is being held in U.S. 
territory, whether the person is a U.S. citizen, to what extent would the courts defer to 
executive fact-finding and decisionmaking processes, etc.-which the Supreme Court is 
currently considering in several cases. 
I should be happy to provide comments on the constitutionality and wisdom of specific 
proposals that Congress may consider to assist the Executive and the Courts in these 
important matters. 
Ouestion: Once an individual is designated as an enemy combatant. what types of 
procedural and substantive safeguards should be afforded to accused individuals, without 
sacrificing our national security interests? 
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As an initial matter, one must distinguish between preliminary processes to determine 
whether a person is an enemy combatant (which are akin to the military or executive version 
of a probable cause hearing) and military tribunals to determine a combatant's unlawful 
conduct (which are akin to the military or executive version of a trial). One should also 
keep in mind that any person under U.S. detention has a right to file a habeas petition to 
challenge the legality of his detention. Whether the courts would intervene depends on a 
host of questions-whether the person is being held in U.S. territory, whether the person is 
a U.S. citizen, to what extent would the courts defer to executive fact-finding and 
decisiorunaking processes, etc.-which the Supreme Court is currently considering in 
several cases. 
The initial decisions by the executive whether to designate a person as an enemy combatant 
subject to military detention or to bring a criminal indictment, whether to achieve justice 
through a military tribunal or through civilian criminal courts, and under what 
circumstances to grant access to counselor other procedures of necessity depend on the 
circumstances of particular cases. That is why, I believe, that the Constitution commits 
these decisions to the Executive in the first instance, subject as always to judicial review 
under habeas proceedings. 
I should be happy to provide comments on the constitutionality and wisdom of specific 
proposals that Congress may consider to assist the Executive and the Courts in these 
important matters. 
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Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
"America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved Or Freedom Lost? 
November 18,2003 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY 
1. Ouestions to witnesses- Professor Djnh 
"Extraordinary Rendition" and Torture / Maher Arar Case: I would like to ask all the 
witnesses for their views on the Maher Arar case. Mr. Arar runs a consulting company in 
Ottawa. He previously worked as an engineer for a high-tech company in Natick, 
Massachusetts. He has dual Canadian and SYrian citizenship, but has not lived in Syria for 
sixteen vears. 
Returning to Montreal from a family visit in Tunisia, Mr. Arar made a stopover at Kennedy 
Airport in New York City on September 26, 2002. Immigration officjals detained him at the 
airport and told him he had no right to a lawyer because he was not an American citizen. He 
Was taken to the Metf9l1Olitan Detention Center in Brooklvn, where F.B.I.. New York 
police, and INS officials interrogated him for several days. Arar repeatedly asked to be sent 
home to Canada. He pleaded not to be sent to Syria, for fear he would be tortured. 
Nevertheless. on October 8th, U.S. officials flew Mr. Afar on a small jet to Washington, 
where a new team of officials got on the plane. Thev flew to Arrunan. where the American 
officials handed Arar over to Jordanian authorities. who chained. blindfolded. and beat Arar 
while transporting him in a van to the Syrian border. In Syria, Mr. Arar was placed in a 
small. dark cell - three feet by six feet, much like a grave - and was confined there for 
almost a full year. He was slapped. beaten. and whipped on his palms. wrists, and back with 
an electric cable. He lost 40 pounds during his confinement. On October 5, 2003, the Syrian 
government released him; Syrian officials have told reporters that their investigators found 
no link between Mr. Arar and AI Qaeda. Mr. Arar is now back home in Canada, 
Ouestion (l): I assume that all agree with the proposition that U.S. officials should never 
engage in torture. Official acts oftorture unequivocally violate the U.S. Constitution. the 
Convention Against Torture. which the U.S. has ratified, and customary intemationallaw. 
Do you believe it is appropriate for U.S. officials to turn over individuals like Maher Arar to 
countries such as Syria with the expectation that they will be tortured? 
ANSWER: 
I agree that the United States and all civilized nations should reject torture unequivocally. 
have neither first-hand knowledge nor adequate understanding of the facts surrounding the 
Arar case to venture an opinion on its handling. 
Ouestion (2): According to news reports, CIA officials have repeatedly engaged in what it 
calls "extraordinary renditions": handing over captives to foreign security services known 
for their brutal treatment of prisoners and use of torture - sometimes with a list of questions 
the agency wants answered. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture provides, "No 
State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are 
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substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Do 
you believe that the current Administration is complying with this proyision? 
ANSWER: 
I do not have any first-hand knowledge concerning extraordinary renditions. Likewise, I 
have no information or basis to believe that the United States is contravening its obligations 
under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. 
Question (3): In a November 6 speech to (he National Endowment for Democracy, 
President Bush condemned the government of SYria for leaving its people "a legacy of 
torture. oppression. misery. and ruin." Syria's use of torture is widely known and has been 
criticized by the State Department in its annual human rights reports. Are you concerned 
that the Administration is undermining its message about human rights and the need for 
change in the Middle East. through its policy of rendering suspects to Syria and other 
countries for torture-based interrogations? 
ANSWER: 
I agree that the United States and all civilized nations should reject torture unequivocally. 
do not have any first-hand knowledge or any basis to believe that the United States has a 
policy of rendering suspects other countries for torture-based interrogations. 
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Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
• America After 9111: Freedom Preserved Or Freedom Lost? 
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QUESTION BY SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY FOR PROFESSOR VIET DINH 
1. To date, the Administration has refused to establish any criteria for who may qualify 
as an "enemy combatant." On November 14, the WashinfJton Post quoted Judge Michael 
Chertoff -- formerly head of the Criminal Division - as stating "it may be time to develop a 
system by which enemy combatants could contest such designations." Do you agree with 
Judge Chertoffs suggestion for a system to allow enemy combatants to contest their 
designation? 
ANSWER: 
The Administration recently announced that it would permit lawyers access to Yasser 
Hamdr and Jose Padilla. This is an important development because the government has 
always maintained that the courthouse doors are open to the detainees to challenge the 
legality of their detention through habeas corpus. Access to counsel makes access to the 
courts meaningful. 
The determination as to when and under what circumstances to grant access to counsel 
disruptive to the interrogation process necessarily rests with the executive in the first 
instance. Few would doubt that, if Al Qaeda leaders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed were 
held in U.S. territory, they would have continuing intelligence value and government efforts 
to extract information should not be disrupted. On the other hand, when access would not 
disrupt the intelligence flow, as the government has decided for Hamdi, the government has 
no reason to bar detainees from speaking with their lawyers. 
There is room for the Administration to move into even safer legal harbor by providing, 
after a reasonable period, some procedure for Padilla and Harndi to contest the underlying 
facts of their detention. It need not be full-dress judicial process. A military hearing to 
evaluate the information underlying the detention would suffice. The Supreme Court is 
more likely to defer to an executive judgment when the process by which it is arrived at is 
capable of inspection. 
The developments in the Hamdi and Padilla cases should comfort those who fear executive 
authority because they demonstrate that the Administration is exercising its discretion 
responsibly to accommodate changed circumstances. Likewise, those who support 
executive prerogative should commend the Administration for not pushing the envelope and 
risk a judicial backlash that would erode presidential authority. 
The Administration's action is especially noteworthy given Congress' silence. Two years 
after the horror of9/11 and recognizing that the Administration's efforts have successfully 
protected the American homeland from another catastrophic terrorist attack, it is time for 
Congress to contribute its voice, either to affirm the President's authority or to suggest 
refinements to Administration policy. I agree with Judge Michael Chertoffthat the country 
collectively needs think more systematically about a sustainable architecture for 
determining when, why, and for how long someone may be detained as an enemy 
combatant. 
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of (he Committee. 
Thank you very much for the honor of appearing before you today. In answer to the 
question posed by this hearing, my view is that the current threat to America's freedom comes 
from Al Qaeda and-others who would do harm to America and her people, and not from the men 
and wornen of law enforcement who protect us from harm. That said, I think that it is critically 
important for us to assess the success of the terrorist prevention effort and, where necessary, to 
consider additional safeguards to the liberties of law-abiding citizens. 
That the American homeland has not suffered another terrorist attack in the last 26 
months is a testament to the incredible efforts of our law enforcement, intelligence, and 
homeland security personnel--aided by the tools, resources and guidance that Congress has 
provided. According to Department of Justice figures, 284 individuals of interest to the 9111 
investigation have been criminally charged, and 149 of them have been convicted or pled gUilty. 
And 515 individuals linked to the 9/11 investigation have been deported for immigration 
violations. In addition, $133 million in terrorist assets have been frozen around the world, and 
70 terrorist financing investigations have been initiated, with 23 convictions or guilty pleas to 
date. 
These successes would not have been possible without the important work of Congress. 
As the Department of Justice wrote to the House Judiciary Committee on May 13,2003. the 
Government's success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the American homeland 
"would have been much more difficult, if not impossibly so, without the USA Patriot Act." That 
Act, of course, owes its existence to the important and careful work of this Committee and in 
particular to the efforts of Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Leahy. 
During the six weeks of deliberations that led to the passage of the Act, you heard from 
and heeded the advice of a coalition of concerned voices urging caution and care in crafting the 
blueprint for America's security. That conversation was productive, and the Administration and 
Congress drew on the coalition's counsel In crafting the USA PATRIOT Act. 
The debate has since deteriorated, and the shouting voices ignore questions that are 
critical to both security and liberty. Lost among fears about what the government could be doing 
arc questions about what it is actually doing and what else it should be doing to protect security 
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and safeguard liberty. And rhetoric over minor alterations has overshadowed profoundly 
important questions about fundamental changes in law and policy. 
For example, consider the debate relating to section 215 of the Act, the so-called library 
records provision. Critics have rallied against the provision as facilitating a return to J. Edgar 
Hoover's monitoring of reading habits. The American Civil Liberties Union has sued the 
government, claiming that the provision, through its mere existence, foments a chilling fear 
among Muslim organizations and activists. 
I do not doubt that these fears are real, but also am confident that they are unfounded. 
Grand juries for years have issued subpoenas to businesses for records relevant to criminal 
inquiries. Section 215 gives courts the same power, in national security investigations, to issue 
similar orders to businesses, from chemical makers to explosives dealers. Like its criminal grand 
jury equivalent, these judicial orders for business records conceivably could issue to bookstores 
or libraries, but section 215 does not single them out. 
Section 215 is narrow in scope. The FBI cannot use it to investigate garden-variety 
crimes or even domestic terrorism. Instead, section 215 can be used only to "obtain foreign 
intelligence information not concerning a United States person," or to "protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." 
Because section 215 applies only to national security investigations, the orders are 
confidential. Such secrecy raises legitimate concerns, and thus Congress embedded significant 
checks in the process. First, they are issued and supervised by a federal judge. By contrast, 
grand jury subpoenas are routinely issued by the court cierk. 
Second, every six months the government has to report to Congress on the number of 
times and the manner in which the provision has been used. The House Judiciary Committee has 
stated that its review of that information "has not given rise to any concern that the authority is 
being misused or abused." Indeed. the Atlorney General has recently made public the previously 
classified information that section 215 has not been used since its passage. 
It may well be that the clamor over section 215 reflects a different concern, that 
government investigators should not be able to use ordinary criminal investigative tools so easily 
to obtain records from purveyors of First Amendment activities, such as libraries and bookstores. 
Section 215, with its prohibition that investigations "not be conducted of a United States person 
solely upon the basis of activities protected b'y the first amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States," in this regard is more protective of civil liberties than ordinary crintinal 
procedure. Perhaps this limitation should be extended to other investigative lools. But that is a 
different debate, one that should fully consider the costs and benefits of such a change in law. 
All the sound and fury over politically charged issues such as section 215 has drowned 
out constructive dialogue about fundamental changes in policy. For instance, section 218 of the 
USA Patriot Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to facilitate increased 
cooperation between agents gathering intelligence about foreign threats and investigators 
prosecuting foreign terrorists. I doubt that even the most strident of critics would want another 
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terrorist attack to happen because a 30-year-old provision prevented the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities to communicate with each other about potential terrorist threats. 
This change, essential as it is, raises important questions about the narure of law 
enforcement and domestic intelligence. The drafters grappled with questions such as whether 
the change comports with the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures (yes), whether criminal prosecutors should initiate and direct intelligence operations 
(no), and whether there is adequate process for defendants to seek exclusion of intelligence 
evidence from trial (yes). We were confident of the answers. But lawyers are not infallible, and 
the courts ultimately will decide. Meanwhile, bener airing of these weighty issues would help 
the public understand the government's actions and appreciate their effects. 
Some debates focus on the right issues but ask the wrong questions. The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit yesterday heard arguments on the military detention of Jose 
Padilla, captured in O'Hare Airport with an alleged plot to detonate a dirty bomb. Many have 
decried the President's military authority to detain Padilla. But surely a military commander 
should have the power to incapacitate enemy combatants, and Supreme Court precedent 
confirms this common sense proposition. The more difficult question, one that past cases 
provide less guidance, is whether the executive branch can hold these unlawful combatants 
without any process, such as military tribunals or other quasi-judicial alternatives. The judiciary 
is grappling with this question, but I think that Congress also has a significant voice in the 
constitutional discourse and shOUld express its views. Whatever the answer, the question has 
nothing to do with the USA 'Patriot Act, as some have erroneously asserted. 
The debate certainly would benefit from clarity. But more significant are the potential 
costs imposed by the current confUsion. Are unobjectionable innovations not being considered 
that would help further the effort to respond to the continuing terrorist threat? Are unfounded 
criticisms of potential governmental overreach deterring peace officers from taking necessary 
actions to prevent terrorism? And, instead of blanket denunciation and repeal of certain law 
enforcement authorities, are there safeguards that can prevent governmental abuse while 
preserving important law enforcement tools? 
I am heartened that the Committee has convened to consider these and other weighty 
questions. Karl Llewellyn, the renowned law professor, once observed: 'Ideals without 
teclmique are a mess. But technique without ideals is a menace') During these times, when 
the foundation of liberty is under attack, the important work of this Committee will serve to 
reaffllTIl the ideals of our constitutional democracy and also to discern the techniques 
necessary to secure those ideals against the threat of terror. Thank you. 
Karl N. Llewellyn. On What is Wrong with So· Called Legal EducGlion, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 662 
(1935). 
